Letters from Tomis

It is easy to paint past socialist efforts in cold war rhetoric of good and evil. Stalin is a prime example, often portrayed as the embodiment of tyranny and oppression. However, this simplistic view overlooks the complex political landscape of the time, where ideological battles were fought not only on the battlefield but also in the courts of public opinion. The decisions made during Stalin’s regime, while undeniably controversial, were influenced by a range of factors, including the need for rapid industrialization and security concerns arising from external threats. By analyzing these historical events through a more nuanced lens, we can better understand the multifaceted nature of political ideologies and their implications for society.

This is my research on Stalin’s sidelining other members of the “Old Bolsheviks” group of leaders. Any mistakes are mine alone. This is part 2 of 2.

Power Struggle After Lenin’s Death: Stalin vs. Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev & Others

Lenin’s Testament and Reactions of Stalin’s Rivals

When Vladimir Lenin died in January 1924, he left a “Testament”–a letter to party congress delegates–evaluating top Bolshevik leaders and warning against Stalin. Lenin’s Testament was critical of all the potential successors (including Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, and Stalin himself) and famously suggested Stalin be removed from his post as General Secretary. This put Stalin’s allies in a difficult position: the document threatened Stalin’s position, yet openly defying Lenin’s last wishes so soon after his death was risky.

In the end, Stalin and his two chief allies, Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev – collectively known as the troika or triumvirate–suppressed Lenin’s Testament with a compromise at the 13th Party Congress in May 1924. They arranged for Lenin’s letter to be read privately to each delegation (with no note-taking allowed) and banned any mention of it in the full Congress proceedings. This maneuver, adopted by majority vote over Lenin’s widow Nadezhda Krupskaya’s protests, neutralized the Testament’s impact: Stalin kept his post as General Secretary, thanks in part to Zinoviev and Kamenev’s support.

Leon Trotsky, whom Lenin had described as the Revolution’s most capable man (while noting Trotsky’s excessive self-confidence), did not exploit the Testament to attack Stalin at the time. Trotsky and other party leaders were also criticized in Lenin’s notes, and Trotsky chose to maintain party unity rather than press the issue.

In fact, when an ex-Bolshevik, Max Eastman, publicized the existence of Lenin’s Testament abroad, Trotsky publicly denied that the party had “concealed” any of Lenin’s letters–calling such claims “pure slander against the Central Committee”. By downplaying Lenin’s warning, Trotsky hoped to avoid being seen as splitting the party or using Lenin’s name for personal gain. This reluctance is often viewed as a strategic mistake that spared Stalin from an early blow to his credibility. Zinoviev and Kamenev likewise had ulterior motives to bury the Testament–Lenin had scolded them for disloyalty during the 1917 Revolution, so they preferred to keep his criticisms quiet.

Additionally, Zinoviev and Kamenev were at that moment aligned with Stalin in a leadership troika to block Trotsky’s influence. Even Nikolai Bukharin, whom Lenin had praised as a promising theorist (with slight reservations about Bukharin’s understanding of Marxism), acquiesced in the Testament’s suppression. All the senior Bolsheviks essentially closed ranks to prevent Lenin’s last directives from disrupting the leadership balance.

As a show of humility (and perhaps theatrics), Stalin offered to resign as General Secretary when the Testament was circulated among the delegates–but Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others urged him to stay for the sake of collective leadership and party unity. This orchestrated refusal of Stalin’s resignation cemented his image as a team player and diffused Lenin’s criticisms. In short, each of Stalin’s rivals – Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, and others–tolerated or supported the suppression of Lenin’s Testament, a decision that inadvertently helped Stalin solidify his position at the outset of the succession struggle.

Attempts to Counter Stalin’s Growing Power

Despite temporarily cooperating in 1924, Stalin’s rivals soon grew alarmed at his rising influence and took steps to counter him. As General Secretary, Stalin had been quietly building a base of loyal supporters by controlling party appointments and Congress delegations. After Lenin’s death, Stalin portrayed himself as the moderate “center” of the party, while painting others as extremists. In response, Leon Trotsky–Lenin’s famed lieutenant and head of the Red Army–tried to rally opposition to what he saw as the bureaucratization of the party under Stalin.

In late 1923, Trotsky’s followers formed the Left Opposition calling for more internal democracy and faster industrialization, implicitly challenging Stalin’s grip. Trotsky wrote essays like “The New Course” and later “Lessons of October” (1924) recounting the revolution, which highlighted mistakes by Zinoviev and Kamenev in 1917. However, this backfired by antagonizing Zinoviev and Kamenev–driving them back into alliance with Stalin in a campaign to discredit Trotsky. Throughout 1924, the troika isolated Trotsky: his speeches were attacked, his followers demoted, and by January 1925 Trotsky was forced to resign as People’s Commissar of War (leader of the Red Army) under the pressure of orchestrated criticism. Zinoviev even pushed for Trotsky’s full expulsion then, though Stalin shrewdly refused to go that far at the time, positioning himself as a mediator.

With Trotsky sidelined, new rifts emerged. By 1925, Zinoviev and Kamenev grew wary of Stalin’s accumulating power and his policy of “Socialism in One Country” (Stalin’s new theory that the USSR could build socialism on its own). They believed Stalin, bolstered by his control of the party machine, was abandoning collective leadership and Marxist internationalism. That year, Zinoviev and Kamenev formed the New Opposition bloc to challenge Stalin’s policies. They allied with Lenin’s widow Krupskaya and others and at the 14th Party Congress (December 1925), Zinoviev and Kamenev openly confronted Stalin–calling for more democratic debate and even proposing that Stalin be removed as General Secretary.

However, Stalin had spent months lining up support, notably by partnering with Nikolai Bukharin and Alexei Rykov (leaders of the party’s more conservative “Right” wing). Backed by Bukharin’s supporters and a flood of new party members loyal to him, Stalin overwhelmed Zinoviev and Kamenev at the Congress. The Zinoviev–Kamenev faction commanded only the Leningrad delegation and found themselves in a tiny minority; they were roundly defeated in votes. Stalin’s allies dominated the congress, and Kamenev was demoted from the Politburo while Zinoviev was soon stripped of his influential Leningrad party chief post (Stalin dispatched a loyalist, Sergei Kirov, to take over Leningrad). This crushing of the New Opposition left Zinoviev and Kamenev politically weakened.

In 1926, facing Stalin’s continued dominance, the opposition leaders set aside old enmities and united. Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev joined forces in a United Opposition that year, also drawing in minor opposition circles, to challenge Stalin’s regime from within. They campaigned against Stalin’s policies of party bureaucracy and the slow pace of industrialization, asserting that the revolution was veering off course.

Trotsky and Zinoviev in tandem criticized Stalin’s one-country socialism doctrine and urged a return to Leninist norms and more support for world revolution. Throughout 1926–1927, the United Opposition attempted various political maneuvers to rally support: they spoke out at party meetings, circulated their platform privately, and even tried to reach the party rank-and-file directly.

In October 1926, however, Stalin struck back–accusing Zinoviev of abusing his position as head of the Communist International (Comintern) to foment factional dissent. Stalin’s allies, following his orders, expelled Zinoviev from the Politburo in mid-1926 and removed him from the Comintern leadership, nullifying one of the opposition’s power bases.

Despite this setback, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and their supporters persisted in opposing Stalin’s line into 1927. Their last major bid was during the 10th anniversary of the October Revolution in November 1927: the United Opposition organized an independent demonstration in Moscow to voice their policies. This act of open dissent was quickly dispersed by force on Stalin’s orders, and it provided the pretext for a final crackdown. Within days, Trotsky and Zinoviev were expelled from the Communist Party (November 1927), soon followed by Kamenev and dozens of oppositionists at the 15th Party Congress in December 1927. Stalin had effectively outlawed the opposition, removing his chief rivals from positions of influence and even exiling many of them internally in early 1928.

Another mistake was over-reliance on moral authority and Lenin’s legacy. Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev all tried to invoke Leninist principles (and Lenin’s widow) in their battles, assuming party members would rally to Lenin’s known lieutenants and his Testament. But Stalin deftly countered by also claiming Lenin’s mantle–he orchestrated Lenin’s funeral to appear as chief mourner and guardian of Leninism, and promoted the cult of Lenin to bolster his own position as Lenin’s true heir. He then framed the opposition as ambitious “Trotskyists” deviating from Leninism, which resonated with many party cadres. Under the 1921 ban on factions, forming a bloc like the United Opposition was itself seen as violating party unity, further eroding the rivals’ support. In the end, each rival made critical missteps – whether it was underestimating Stalin, failing to unite, or breaking party discipline – that enabled Stalin to gain the upper hand.

Meanwhile, Bukharin and the Right Opposition initially cooperated with Stalin through these battles, as they shared a commitment to the moderate New Economic Policy. Bukharin helped Stalin discredit the left, co-authoring the doctrine of socialism in one country and enjoying Stalin’s support against Trotsky through 1926-27. But after the Left Opposition was crushed, Stalin no longer needed Bukharin’s bloc.

By 1928, facing economic difficulties (like grain shortages) and eager to accelerate industrialization, Stalin abruptly shifted leftward to policies the Left had advocated rapid collectivization and Five-Year Plans. This put him at odds with Bukharin, Rykov, and Mikhail Tomsky (the trade unions chief), who warned against harsh measures on peasants. Bukharin attempted to counter Stalin’s new line by defending the NEP and advocating more gradual change. He even reached out to Kamenev in summer 1928, seeking a discreet alliance between the defeated Left and the threatened Right.

This was a desperate maneuver to check Stalin’s power, but it backfired: Stalin soon learned of Bukharin’s secret contacts and used them to accuse Bukharin of “factionalism”–the very charge that had doomed Trotsky’s group. In 1929, Stalin moved decisively against the Right Opposition, having Bukharin removed from key posts (he lost the editorship of Pravda and his Politburo seat) and later expelling some of his allies from the leadership. By the end of the 1920s, no organized opposition remained–all of Stalin’s one-time peers had been neutralized or coerced into submission.

Divisions and Strategic Mistakes Among the Rivals

A major reason Stalin prevailed was the disunity and errors of his rivals. The Bolshevik leaders opposing Stalin often undermined each other instead of presenting a united front. In the early 1920s, Trotsky’s aloof demeanor and his history as a late-joiner to Bolshevism bred mistrust with the party Old Guard. Zinoviev and Kamenev deeply distrusted Trotsky, fearing his popularity with the Red Army and masses could make him a dictator (“Bonapartist”) after Lenin. This drove them to make a fateful alliance with Stalin in 1923–24.

By teaming up with Stalin to sideline Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev handed Stalin the keys to the party machine, not realizing how effectively he’d use it. Indeed, their triad dominated the 13th Party Conference and Congress through pre-arranged delegate selection, crushing Trotsky’s supporters. But outside Petrograd (Zinoviev’s power base), Zinoviev and Kamenev had little independent support; meanwhile, Stalin quietly built a nationwide network of loyal provincial party secretaries who owed their positions to him.

Zinoviev and Kamenev’s first mistake was underestimating Stalin’s capacity to build patronage and thinking they could control the unassuming General Secretary. They also suppressed Lenin’s Testament, an act that protected Stalin in 1924–a second mistake that Zinoviev in particular came to regret. Years later, Zinoviev reminded Stalin how they had saved him from “political downfall” by burying Lenin’s criticisms, only to get the cold reply: “Gratitude is a dog’s disease”. In hindsight, by shielding Stalin early on, the troika members sowed the seeds of their own demise.

Trotsky’s mistakes were different. As a brilliant orator and revolutionary hero, Trotsky assumed the strength of his ideas and past service would carry him, and he neglected to build a grassroots faction. He disdainfully left the party bureaucracy to Stalin and rarely engaged in backroom coalition-building. This proved costly: by the time Trotsky mobilized his supporters in 1923, Stalin already held key organizational levers. Trotsky also alienated potential allies with his intellectual arrogance. He had often belittled Stalin (once mocking Stalin’s lack of education and calling him “not fit for high office”), which fostered Stalin’s bitter enmity.

Likewise, Trotsky’s 1924 “Lessons of October” essay, while intended to bolster his revolutionary credentials, offended Zinoviev and Kamenev by dredging up their 1917 opposition to Lenin’s plans. This tactical error drove them straight back into Stalin’s camp, sabotaging any chance that Trotsky might split them away. Furthermore, Trotsky consistently adhered to party rules even as Stalin bent them–for example, Trotsky honored the 1921 ban on factions and avoided creating an extra-party movement. His restraint (born of principle and fear of civil war within the party) meant he never pressed his temporary advantages. Not insisting Lenin’s Testament be publicized, not fighting harder against his dismissal in 1925, and not courting the rank-and-file Communists (who were being swayed by Stalin’s apparatus) all proved to be blunders that left Trotsky isolated.

By the time Trotsky teamed up with Zinoviev and Kamenev in 1926, it appeared as an act of desperation rather than a confident challenge, and many rank-and-file Communists saw the United Opposition as just a squabbling faction of disgruntled ex-leaders rather than a credible alternative. Their November 1927 demonstration outside party authority was another miscalculation–it allowed Stalin to paint them as law-breakers against party unity and justify their expulsion.

Ideological divisions also hampered Stalin’s opponents. Trotsky and the Left Opposition advocated “Permanent Revolution”–pushing for international revolution and rapid socialist measures at home–whereas Bukharin and the Right favored the New Economic Policy and a slower, Russia-focused approach. These two camps fundamentally disagreed on policy, making it hard to unite even when both were threatened by Stalin.

In 1926–27, Zinoviev and Kamenev (previously on the right) swung left to join Trotsky, but Bukharin stayed aligned with Stalin at that time, dismissing the left’s warnings. By the time Bukharin realized Stalin could turn on him too, the leftists had been crushed, and any alliance between Bukharin and the ex-Left Opposition in 1928 came far too late–and merely gave Stalin ammunition to denounce Bukharin as a factionalist. In effect, the rival leaders never coordinated a joint strategy against Stalin when it mattered most. Instead, they sequentially fell victim as isolated groups: first Trotsky’s left, then Zinoviev/Kamenev’s center-left bloc, and finally Bukharin’s right. Their failure to trust each other and overcome ideological rifts allowed Stalin to pick them off one by one.

Stalin’s Tactics and the Defeat of His Rivals

Joseph Stalin outmaneuvered his rivals through a combination of shrewd political tactics, control of party machinery, and exploiting others’ weaknesses. As General Secretary from 1922, Stalin had the power to appoint local party secretaries and manage organizational details–a mundane role that he transformed into a base of bureaucratic power. He placed loyalists in key positions and quietly built a patronage network such that by the mid-1920s, Congress delegates from across the USSR often owed him their careers.

This paid off when votes were taken at Party Congresses; for instance, Stalin’s team packed the 13th Conference (1924) and 14th Congress (1925) with pro-Stalin delegates, ensuring Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev were outvoted. Stalin was a master of divide and rule: he first allied with Zinoviev and Kamenev to knock out Trotsky (branding Trotsky the main “oppositionist”), then once Trotsky was exiled, Stalin allied with Bukharin to marginalize Zinoviev and Kamenev as “deviationists,” and finally he turned against Bukharin and the Right when they outlived their usefulness. At each stage, Stalin presented himself as a moderate centrist while tarring whichever group opposed him as a disruptive faction. This chameleonic approach left his opponents off-balance and unable to form a united front.

Stalin also leveraged ideology to his advantage. In 1924, he introduced the concept of “Socialism in One Country,” appealing to national pride and the practical desire to build socialism at home despite the failure of European revolutions. This vision was popular among party activists and gave Stalin a doctrinal edge over Trotsky’s calls for worldwide revolution, which seemed risky and abstract to war-weary Soviet citizens. By championing a middle line (continuing Lenin’s NEP for a time, then shifting to rapid industrialization when conditions fit), Stalin appropriated the policies of both right and left as needed–undercutting his rivals’ platforms. For example, after defeating Trotsky and the Left Opposition (who wanted rapid industrialization), Stalin in 1928 adopted a version of their program (the First Five-Year Plan), catching Bukharin’s Right Opposition flat-footed. In doing so, Stalin made himself the driving force of policy in whatever direction he chose, while depicting rivals as ideological extremists or flip-floppers.

Crucially, Stalin benefited from the Communist Party’s commitment to “discipline” and unity. He vigorously enforced the ban on factions, so when Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev organized their opposition bloc, Stalin could expel them for violating party rules rather than for the content of their ideas . He cast his maneuvering as defense of party unity and Leninist orthodoxy.

Many in the party had grown suspicious of factional infighting (blamed for past splits), so Stalin’s hardline stance against “Trotskyism” won backing. Furthermore, Stalin exploited personal vulnerabilities: he was careful to appear as a humble, Lenin-like figure (even though Lenin had actually criticized him). For instance, offering to resign after Lenin’s Testament was revealed–knowing the Party would reject it–made him look self-effacing and cemented the idea that the leadership as a whole wanted him to continue. He also maintained a veneer of moderation in public, even as he ruthlessly orchestrated attacks behind the scenes. This duplicitous approach caused opponents to underestimate him until it was too late. Many Old Bolsheviks simply could not imagine “comrade Stalin” would ultimately eliminate them all; they saw him as crude but reliable, an apparatchik who would never outshine Lenin’s true disciples. Stalin used that complacency to his benefit.

In practice, Stalin’s consolidation of power unfolded through key events in the 1920s:

• 1924: With Lenin gone, Stalin’s allies defeated Trotsky’s position at party forums; Stalin remained General Secretary despite Lenin’s warning. He began presenting himself as Lenin’s heir, even giving tours of lectures on “Leninism” to burnish his credentials. Meanwhile, thousands of new members from the “Lenin Enrolment” swelled the party ranks–these younger, less experienced members tended to support Stalin, who controlled appointments .

• 1925: Stalin formed a dominant bloc with Bukharin on the right. At the 14th Party Congress, he crushed Zinoviev and Kamenev’s dissent, leaving him virtually unchallenged in the Politburo. After the Congress, Stalin swiftly removed Zinoviev from his regional power base in Leningrad, replacing opposition strongmen with Stalin loyalists.

• 1926–1927: Stalin methodically purged opposition voices. He engineered the expulsion of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and dozens of their followers from the Party by the end of 1927. This was done under the guise of quashing factionalism and protecting the revolution from internal division. By early 1928, Trotsky was exiled to Central Asia and later expelled from the Soviet Union altogether . Zinoviev and Kamenev, facing political survival, capitulated and “admitted” their errors, which Stalin allowed in exchange for their marginalization and public humiliation.

• 1928–1929: Stalin then moved against his erstwhile right-wing allies. Citing the need for rapid industrialization, he abandoned Bukharin’s slow-and-steady approach and implemented radical policies (grain seizures, forced collectivization). When Bukharin protested, Stalin accused him of factional dissent and removed him from influence. By 1929, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky were effectively stripped of power. Trotsky, the last symbolic rival, was expelled from the USSR entirely in 1929. At this point, Stalin stood unopposed at the pinnacle of the Soviet Communist Party–he had outmaneuvered or eliminated all of Lenin’s potential successors .

By the end of the 1920s, Stalin had consolidated dictatorial authority over the party and state. His rivals’ fates in the following years underscored his victory: Trotsky would live in exile (and later be assassinated in 1940 on Stalin’s orders), while Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Bukharin, after temporary penance, were eventually arrested and executed in Stalin’s Great Purge of the 1930s. But the critical struggle was the one immediately after Lenin’s death. In that contest, Stalin’s political skill– forging shifting alliances, exploiting rules and divisions, and ruthlessly removing opponents–allowed him to defeat Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and all other contenders and become the supreme leader of the Soviet Union.