Letters from Tomis

Introduction

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded in 1921 on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, yet its ideological trajectory has been anything but static. Over the decades, especially under the leadership of Mao Zedong, the CCP’s ideology underwent significant evolution. Mao Zedong’s era (1940s–1976) was a formative period in which Marxist-Leninist theory was interpreted and adapted to Chinese realities, giving rise to what became known as Mao Zedong Thought. This period saw the development of distinctive approaches such as the Mass Line, an emphasis on the revolutionary role of the peasantry, the practice of democratic centralism, and a commitment to socialist construction and ongoing class struggle. Grounded in Marxist philosophy, Mao’s CCP pursued a dialectical relationship between theory and practice – constantly refining ideas through experience. This essay explores the ideological evolution of the CCP from a pro-communist perspective, examining how Marxist-Leninist ideology was applied and modified under Mao Zedong’s leadership. It highlights key ideological innovations of the Mao era and the dialectical interplay of theory and practice in CCP strategy and policy.

Marxism-Leninism in Chinese Context: Mao Zedong Thought Emerges

From its inception, the CCP drew inspiration from the works of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin. However, the task facing Chinese revolutionaries was to apply these theories to a largely agrarian, semi-feudal, semi-colonial society. Mao Zedong was at the forefront of “sinifying” Marxism-Leninism – adapting the universal truths of Marxist theory to the concrete conditions of China. In the 1930s and 1940s, during the revolutionary war against the Kuomintang and Japanese invasion, Mao’s ideas crystallized into what would later be called Mao Zedong Thought. This was essentially Marxism-Leninism integrated with Chinese conditions and enriched by Mao’s own innovations.

A core premise of Mao’s adaptation was the slogan “seek truth from facts,” which encapsulated the Marxist approach of basing theory on reality. Instead of importing every doctrinal tenet from the Soviet experience, the CCP under Mao insisted on investigating China’s actual conditions – social classes, economic realities, and historical context – and formulating strategy accordingly. This empirically minded and non-dogmatic approach meant that the CCP’s ideology evolved through practical experience. Mao and his comrades emphasized that revolutionary theory must serve practice and be tested by it. In Mao’s words, correct ideas do not fall from the sky; they come from social practice and in turn guide action. Thus, early on, Mao stressed the dialectical unity of theory and practice: learning from the people’s experiences, developing policies, and then observing outcomes to refine the theory.

By the Seventh CCP Congress in 1945, Mao Zedong’s leadership and ideas were officially affirmed, marking the maturation of Mao Zedong Thought. This emerging ideology addressed key questions of the Chinese revolution: Who are the motive forces of revolution? What strategies can lead to victory in China’s conditions? Mao’s answers diverged in some ways from orthodox Marxist expectations and laid the groundwork for the CCP’s unique path. He identified the primary revolutionary classes in China and famously elevated the role of the peasantry (alongside the proletariat) in a way that classical Marxism had not. Mao also developed the theory of New Democracy, envisioning a stage of revolution where a coalition of revolutionary classes (proletariat, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, and even the patriotic national bourgeoisie) would unite under the leadership of the CCP to overthrow imperialism and feudalism. This New Democratic stage was seen as a necessary precursor to a socialist transformation given China’s backward conditions. Such ideas exemplified Mao’s creative adaptation of Lenin’s theory of revolution by incorporating a broader class alliance.

During the Yan’an period (1936–1948), Mao produced major theoretical works such as “On Practice” and “On Contradiction,” which provided the Marxist philosophical underpinning for the CCP’s strategies. In these works, Mao elaborated on dialectical materialism, emphasizing that contradiction exists in all processes and that understanding the primary contradiction in each situation is key to formulating correct strategy. Applying this, Mao analyzed that the fundamental contradiction in semi-colonial China was between the masses (broadly the oppressed classes) and the ruling bloc of imperialists, feudal landlords, and bureaucrat-capitalists. Therefore, the revolutionary strategy had to unite all who could be united against the main enemy. This thinking led to the CCP’s emphasis on a united front and guerrilla warfare from rural bases – a line very different from the urban insurrection model initially advocated by the Communist International in the 1920s. By tailoring Marxist theory to Chinese particularities, Mao Zedong Thought emerged as a distinct body of ideology that would guide the CCP to victory in 1949 and continue to shape policy afterward.

The Mass Line and the Role of the Peasantry

One of the hallmark innovations of Maoist ideology is the Mass Line, a method of leadership and communication between the Party and the masses. The Mass Line’s essence is often summarized by Mao’s phrase “from the masses, to the masses.” This means that the Party must derive its ideas from the people at large and then concentrate those ideas into coherent policies, which are then implemented back among the people. Rather than a one-way top-down decree, policy formation is seen as an iterative process:

1. Gather ideas from the masses: Party cadres live among workers and peasants, learn about their needs and insights, and collect their suggestions and experiences.

2. Process and synthesize: These raw ideas are then analyzed in light of Marxist-Leninist theory and the Party’s objectives. The leadership “concentrates” the scattered thoughts of the masses into a set of policies or solutions that address the people’s fundamental interests.

3. Return to the masses: The refined ideas (now policy decisions or directives) are propagated back to the masses for implementation. As the people put these policies into practice, the Party observes the results, gathers feedback, and adjusts its strategy accordingly.

Through this continuous loop, the Mass Line ensures that leadership remains closely connected to the people’s real conditions. Ideologically, it operationalizes the Marxist concept that the masses are the makers of history – the Party leads effectively only by articulating the people’s own aspirations in a scientific way. In practice, the Mass Line under Mao led the CCP to champion policies that had popular resonance, such as land reform, literacy campaigns, and health initiatives, all carried out with mass mobilization. It also acted as a check against bureaucratism by requiring officials to stay attuned to the grassroots. From a Marxist viewpoint, the Mass Line reflects a dialectical relationship between leaders and led: the people educate the Party with their experience, and the Party elevates this experience with theory to guide the people – a unity of knowledge and action.

Closely related to the Mass Line was Mao’s emphasis on the role of the peasantry in revolution. Classical Marxism considered the industrial proletariat as the primary revolutionary force, viewing peasants as a subsidiary, often conservative, class. However, in China’s case the industrial working class was very small, while peasants made up the overwhelming majority and bore the brunt of feudal and colonial oppression. Mao Zedong recognized that the impoverished peasantry had tremendous revolutionary potential if they could be organized and given political consciousness. As early as his 1927 “Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” Mao praised the revolutionary fervor of poor peasants, famously noting that the “poor and blank” nature of the peasantry was advantageous – “blank” like a sheet of paper ready to be written with fresh revolutionary ideas.

Under Mao’s guidance, the CCP positioned itself as a champion of the peasants’ interests, promising land redistribution and an end to landlord exploitation. The strategy of People’s War that Mao developed was fundamentally a peasant guerrilla strategy: build revolutionary base areas in the countryside, mobilize and arm the peasants, and encircle the cities from the villages. By the late 1930s and 1940s, the CCP had indeed “proletarianized” the peasantry in the sense that it instilled socialist consciousness and discipline into what was traditionally a dispersed class. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) itself was a peasants’ army led by communist ideology, and it practiced the Mass Line by maintaining close ties with villagers (enforcing strict discipline like not taking a single needle from the people without fair exchange). This reliance on peasants was a dramatic reinterpretation of Marxist revolution, showcasing Mao’s creative application of theory: he turned a class that Marx thought only capable of spontaneous uprisings into a class conscious force for socialist revolution. The success of the Chinese Revolution in 1949, achieved by a predominantly peasant-based movement, vindicated Mao’s line and made it a point of reference for other Third World revolutionary movements. In Maoist thought, the peasantry under proletarian leadership could carry out the democratic revolution and transition into socialism, proving that Marxist-Leninist principles could be realized outside the industrialized world by mobilizing the rural masses.

Democratic Centralism and Party Leadership under Mao

To implement its revolutionary goals, the CCP under Mao adhered to the Leninist principle of democratic centralism. Democratic centralism was the organizational method by which the party combined internal democracy with unified discipline. In practice, this meant that within the Party, members were encouraged to engage in open discussion, debate policies, and even critique leadership – up to the point when a decision was made. Once the Central Committee or a higher body reached a decision, all members were expected to uphold it unanimously, executing it with full discipline. This structure aimed to balance democracy (to enliven policy with collective wisdom and prevent commandism) with centralism (to ensure unity in action and avoid fragmentation).

During the Mao era, democratic centralism was a key mechanism for ideological development and enforcement. Mao himself conducted periodic rectification campaigns within the Party to reinforce ideological unity. For example, in the Yan’an Rectification Movement (1942–1944), Mao led a campaign of criticism and self-criticism sessions to educate cadres in the “correct” line and weed out both dogmatism and excessive liberalism. This was done in a spirit of “unity–criticism–unity,” a Maoist formula whereby the Party first unites on basic principles, then permits criticism and struggle over issues, and finally achieves a higher unity on a new basis. From a Marxist standpoint, this approach was meant to resolve contradictions within the Party in a constructive manner—through dialectical negation, the Party purges mistaken ideas and strengthens its revolutionary purpose.

After the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, Mao described the new state as a “people’s democratic dictatorship,” reflecting a blend of democratic participation with the dictatorship of the proletariat. In this concept, democracy was extended to the people (the working masses and their allies) while dictatorship was applied against reactionary forces. Democratic centralism became not just an internal Party matter but a principle of governance: the people would elect local councils and partake in mass organizations (bringing in a degree of democratic input), but central authority of the CCP would ultimately coordinate and lead all activity to ensure socialist direction.

Throughout the 1950s, there were practical challenges and evolutions in how democratic centralism functioned. The CCP did allow relatively open discussions at times—for instance, Mao’s Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1956–1957 initially encouraged intellectuals and party members to freely voice criticisms and ideas to “let a hundred schools of thought contend.” This brief liberalization was an application of inner-party democracy and mass supervision of the government. However, when the criticisms spiraled in ways Mao perceived as threatening to Party rule, he swiftly reversed course with the Anti-Rightist Campaign, silencing dissent. This episode highlighted a tension in Mao’s practice of democratic centralism: the desire for honest feedback and correction of errors, versus the priority of maintaining party unity and ideological purity. Ultimately, centralism and the imperative of unity tended to win out when push came to shove.

Under Mao’s leadership, the CCP increasingly centered around his personal authority, especially after the mid-1960s. While early on Mao worked with other senior leaders collectively, by the time of the Cultural Revolution he was invoking his own thought as the supreme guide (the slogan “Mao Zedong Thought is the compass for the Chinese people” became common). From a sympathetic perspective, one could argue that Mao’s dominance was seen as necessary to prevent the Party from straying into “revisionism” or capitalist tendencies. Yet it also meant that the democratic aspect of democratic centralism diminished in practice during the later Mao years. Critiques were only sanctioned if they aligned with Mao’s revolutionary line—for example, Red Guard youths were encouraged to criticize and even topple local party officials deemed “capitalist roaders,” but criticizing Mao or the core line was forbidden. In sum, democratic centralism under Mao provided the CCP a disciplined structure to enact socialist transformation, and it evolved into a centralized system of leadership that, while maintaining the rhetoric of collective decision-making, in practice often followed the vision of Mao as the helmsman. From a Marxist-Leninist standpoint, the justification was that a strong unified party was essential to defend the proletarian dictatorship and advance the revolution, even if it meant temporarily constraining certain democratic processes.

Socialist Construction and Class Struggle in the Mao Era

With nationwide victory achieved in 1949, the CCP under Mao shifted focus from waging revolution to socialist construction – building a new social and economic order in China. The Mao era (1949–1976) was characterized by ambitious efforts to industrialize the country, transform agriculture, and reshape social relations along socialist lines. Mao’s ideological vision for this period was rooted in Marxist-Leninist principles but adapted to the realities of a poor, primarily agrarian society. Key aspects of socialist construction included land reform, the creation of cooperative and collective agriculture, state control of major industries, and central economic planning. However, Mao’s approach to constructing socialism was not static; it went through phases and was marked by debates over the correct path, reflecting the dialectical interplay of theory and practice.

In the early 1950s, the CCP followed a model inspired by the Soviet Union’s experience: a First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957) emphasized heavy industry development in the cities, with substantial Soviet aid and technical guidance. Simultaneously, agriculture was gradually reorganized from individual farming to mutual aid teams, then low-level cooperatives, and eventually higher-level agricultural cooperatives. By 1956-57, private ownership of land had largely been replaced by collective farming, and private businesses in the cities were transformed into state-private joint enterprises or fully nationalized. These moves represented the completion of the socialist “transition” in ownership – an astonishingly swift transformation of China’s class structure achieved in just a few years. From a pro-communist perspective, this was a heroic accomplishment: the exploitation of landlords and capitalists was ended, laying the economic foundation for socialism. Mao declared that China had basically established a socialist system by the mid-1950s.

However, success brought new challenges. Mao grew concerned that simply copying the Soviet model had introduced bureaucratic tendencies and inequalities that could stifle the revolutionary spirit. By 1956, the Chinese leadership engaged in critical reflection on how to avoid the stagnation they perceived in other socialist countries. Mao put forward his theory of handling contradictions in socialist society – distinguishing between “contradictions among the people” and “contradictions between the people and the enemy.” He believed that dissent or differences among the working people should be handled through democratic discussion and criticism (non-antagonistic methods), whereas class enemies should be dealt with by dictatorial means. This outlook influenced campaigns like the Hundred Flowers, which was conceived as a way to resolve non-antagonistic contradictions by hearing out criticism. Although that particular initiative backfired from the CCP’s viewpoint, it showed Mao’s attempt to navigate socialist governance using dialectical insights.

By the late 1950s, Mao pushed the bold vision of the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) as an alternative approach to socialist construction. Ideologically, the Great Leap Forward embodied Mao’s faith in mass mobilization and his desire to accelerate the transition to communism. Instead of the traditional focus on expert-driven industrialization, Mao advocated a “leap” by tapping the energy of the masses: rural communes were established combining agriculture with small-scale industry, and campaigns like backyard steel smelting were launched to rapidly boost production. The people’s communes were not only economic units but social ones – they aimed to integrate peasants into large collectives that would eventually provide for all needs collectively, foreshadowing a communist society without significant distinctions between town and countryside or mental and manual labor. The Great Leap was thus driven by an egalitarian and utopian impulse consistent with Marxist ideals, emphasizing politics in command and revolutionary enthusiasm over cautious technocratic planning.

In practical terms, the Great Leap Forward encountered serious problems: disorganization, natural disasters, inflated production reports, and overextension of resources led to a collapse of output and a terrible famine in 1959–1961. A Marxist analysis might attribute the failure to a contradiction between revolutionary will and material reality – the subjective desire to push forward outstripped the objective conditions. Mao himself eventually acknowledged that the Leap had gone too far too fast. In the early 1960s, more moderate leaders like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping implemented adjustments: consolidating the communes, allowing some private plots, and restoring incentives to revive the economy. This period illustrated the CCP’s learning process – the leadership corrected course after a grand experiment faltered, demonstrating the dialectical principle that truth is tested through practice. Mao temporarily retreated from daily governance, but he did not abandon his ideological convictions.

A central theme in Maoist ideology is that class struggle does not end with the establishment of socialism – it continues in new forms. After the basic socialist structures were in place, Mao grew wary that new privileged elites were emerging within the Communist Party and state. He feared that the revolutionary cause could be undermined by “revisionists” (those who would allegedly restore capitalism or deviate from Marxist principles) from within. This concern was sharpened by events abroad (such as the de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union and the reformist tendencies Mao perceived there) and by China’s own experience of economic readjustment, which to Mao looked like backpedaling on egalitarian ideals.

By the mid-1960s, Mao launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) as a mass political movement to rekindle class struggle and prevent capitalist restoration. Ideologically, the Cultural Revolution was presented as a means to “continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.” Mao called on China’s youth and the masses to challenge authority wherever it drifted from the revolutionary path. Students formed Red Guard groups, and slogans like “to rebel is justified” were encouraged within the framework of attacking bourgeois elements in society and government. The Cultural Revolution was thus an unprecedented experiment in empowering the masses to directly participate in reshaping the superstructure (culture, education, ideology) and in “bombarding” the highest echelons of the Party if necessary. In Marxist terms, it was a bid to resolve the contradiction between the progressive forces and the vestiges of bourgeois ideology by unleashing mass criticism and class struggle.

From a pro-communist perspective, the Cultural Revolution can be seen as Mao’s attempt to realize a form of direct democracy and mass supervision over the Party, keeping the revolution alive and dynamic. It sought to abolish the “four olds” (old customs, culture, habits, ideas) and to elevate workers and peasants in all spheres of life (for example, sending urban youth to the countryside to learn from peasants, reforming education to favor proletarian background students, etc.). The movement did succeed in preventing any obvious capitalist restoration during that decade and it created a fervent egalitarian culture. However, it also plunged China into chaos at times and led to factional violence and economic disarray. By the early 1970s, even Mao reined in the revolution’s excesses by rehabilitating the state structure and using the PLA to restore order.

Nevertheless, Mao’s insistence on continuous revolution left a deep imprint on CCP ideology. It reinforced the principle that the class struggle must be consciously carried on even after structural victories, aligning with Marx’s idea that socialism is a transitional phase rife with contradictions. The Maoist era’s latter years thus highlighted the dialectical tension between building new economic foundations and transforming social relations and consciousness. Mao prioritized the latter in the Cultural Revolution, demonstrating his belief that ideological remolding and mass political action were crucial to reaching a true communist society, not just economic development alone.

Theory and Practice: A Dialectical Relationship

Throughout the Mao Zedong era, a defining feature of CCP ideology was the intimate intertwining of revolutionary theory and practical action – a reflection of Marxist dialectical materialism. Mao’s guiding philosophy was that theory must be verified and refined through practice, and conversely, practice must be illuminated by revolutionary theory. This dialectical relationship is evident in all the aforementioned developments.

Mao’s writings, such as “On Practice,” argued that knowledge begins with experience. In revolutionary China, this was more than an abstract notion; it meant that each policy or strategy was treated as an experiment from which lessons would be drawn. For example, the rural base area strategy and guerrilla warfare tactics were not prescribed by any previous Marxist text – they emerged from bitter early failures in urban uprisings and the practical realization that China’s revolution had to start in the countryside. Mao generalized that lesson into theory (the concept of people’s war and encircling the cities), which then guided the CCP to eventual victory. This is a clear case of praxis: practice informing theory, which then guided new practice.

Another instance is economic policy in the 1950s and 1960s. Mao was critical of dogmatically following the Soviet blueprint when it did not suit Chinese conditions. After observing the issues of rigid central planning and bureaucracy, he theorized alternative paths (e.g., decentralization and mobilization during the Great Leap) that were then attempted in practice. When those proved problematic, Mao and the Party again had to reassess the theory. The ability to reflect and adjust demonstrated a dialectical method at work. In essence, Maoist ideology treated social development as a series of contradictions to be resolved: each policy success or failure yielded new knowledge. Rather than seeing setbacks as reasons to abandon the revolutionary line, Mao saw them as part of a learning curve – temporary negations that could be overcome by a higher level of understanding. This mirrored the dialectical idea of the negation of negation, where the revolution could suffer reversals but ultimately move forward on a more advanced level.

The Mass Line itself is a concrete application of dialectical epistemology. It treats the masses’ experience as the raw material for knowledge (thesis), the Party’s analysis as the processing (antithesis), and the resulting policy as a synthesis – which in turn becomes a new thesis when implemented and tested, starting the cycle anew. This iterative spiral development is a very dialectical way of governing. It acknowledges that truth is not absolute at once; it unfolds through a process of approximation, correction, and deeper approximation.

Mao’s approach to contradictions was also dialectical in balancing the unity and struggle of opposites. Within the Party, controlled “struggle” in the form of criticism and self-criticism was encouraged to resolve differences (for instance, Mao’s injunction that “contradictions among the people” be handled by discussion rather than force). At the societal level, Mao believed the socialist society still contained antagonistic contradictions (with remaining bourgeois mindsets or new elite tendencies), which had to be confronted through class struggle. By framing these challenges in theoretical terms (such as identifying emerging “capitalist roaders” as a contradiction), Mao provided a theoretical justification for mass campaigns like the Cultural Revolution. And when those campaigns played out, he and the Party drew theoretical lessons from the outcomes. Indeed, after Mao’s death, the CCP would officially evaluate the Mao era, acknowledging both the contributions and mistakes – a final act of theory reflecting on practice.

In summary, the Mao era of the CCP exemplified Marx’s dictum that theory becomes a material force when it grips the masses. Maoist ideology was not a fixed dogma but a dynamic guide to action, constantly shaped by practical experience. The dialectical relationship between theory and practice was evidenced by the CCP’s willingness to pilot new initiatives, its emphasis on learning from mistakes, and Mao’s own philosophical treatises that rooted Chinese communist strategy in Marxist dialectics. This synergy between thought and action was crucial to the CCP’s survival and successes during difficult historical trials.

Conclusion

Under Mao Zedong’s leadership, the Chinese Communist Party’s ideology evolved in profound ways, resulting in a distinctly Chinese form of Marxism-Leninism. The Mao era demonstrated how revolutionary theory could be molded to fit a country’s unique social structure and how, conversely, practice on the ground could reshape theory. The CCP developed an ideological framework that stressed mass participation, whether through the Mass Line’s feedback mechanism or the elevation of the peasantry as a revolutionary backbone; it maintained party unity and discipline through democratic centralism while navigating the tensions between openness and control; it pursued socialist construction by both learning from foreign models and innovating its own (sometimes radical) approaches; and it kept the torch of class struggle burning to continuously drive social transformation and guard against regression.

From a pro-communist perspective, the legacy of the Mao Zedong era is one of bold experimentation and unwavering commitment to building socialism. Mao’s Marxist philosophical outlook – particularly the dialectical method – infused the CCP with the understanding that socialism would develop through trial, error, and constant struggle between old and new. The achievements of that period were significant: the abolition of feudal exploitation in the countryside, the creation of a self-reliant national economy, improvements in literacy and public health, and the forging of a national identity independent of imperialist subjugation. These were accomplished not by technocratic management alone, but by ideologically mobilizing hundreds of millions to take part in remolding society.

Although the Mao era had its upheavals and the post-Mao CCP would later introduce economic reforms, the ideological foundations laid by Mao Zedong remain a reference point. Even today, the CCP upholds Mao Zedong Thought as a source of guidance, acknowledging its role in enriching Marxism-Leninism. The Maoist emphasis on serving the people, on selfless dedication to the cause, and on maintaining a revolutionary vision continues to inspire pro-socialist narratives in China and beyond. In conclusion, the ideological evolution of the CCP in the Mao era illustrates the dynamic, dialectical nature of Marxist thought in practice – an evolution that turned a small group of revolutionaries into the leaders of a social transformation affecting one quarter of humanity. It stands as a testament to how theory, when deeply integrated with practice, can change the course of history.