Letters from Tomis

Introduction

Marxist theory has long grappled with the role of the state in societies divided by class. Vladimir Lenin, Antonio Gramsci, and Rosa Luxemburg—writing in the early 20th century amidst revolutions and upheavals—each offered influential but distinct analyses. Lenin, in The State and Revolution (1917), argued from an orthodox Marxist position that the state is fundamentally an instrument of class oppression and must be destroyed and replaced by a proletarian state on the road to a classless society. Gramsci, through his Prison Notebooks (1929–1935), expanded Marxist theory to emphasize hegemony: the idea that the capitalist state maintains rule not only by force but by cultural leadership and consent. Luxemburg, in works like Reform or Revolution (1900) and her 1918 critique The Russian Revolution, upheld the Marxist view of the state as a class organ while insisting on revolutionary rupture; however, she diverged by stressing that the dictatorship of the proletariat must be deeply democratic and not degenerate into rule by a party elite. This comparative review will examine each theorist’s conceptualization of the state’s function in class society, its necessity under capitalism, and its transformation or abolition through revolution. It will highlight their shared Marxist foundations as well as key divergences on issues like hegemony, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the state’s coercive vs. ideological functions.

Marxist Foundations: The State as an Instrument of Class Rule

All three thinkers build on the classic Marxist foundation that the state in any class society is not a neutral arbiter but a product of class antagonisms—a tool for the domination of the ruling class. As Lenin succinctly put it (following Marx and Engels), “the state is an instrument of class domination”. In a capitalist society, the bourgeoisie wields the state to enforce its economic interests and suppress the working class. Rosa Luxemburg affirmed this view in her polemic against reformism: “The present State is, first of all, an organisation of the ruling class,” which may take on general social functions only insofar as they align with the interests of the dominant class. Likewise, Gramsci assumed the state’s fundamental purpose is to uphold the hegemony of the ruling class bloc. Each agreed that the bourgeois state arose from irreconcilable class conflicts and is structurally bound to maintain the existing class order.

Despite this shared premise, all anticipated that this class-bound state is historically transient. In line with Marx, they envisaged that a successful proletarian revolution would create a new form of state (a workers’ state) which, after a transition, could “wither away” once class antagonisms are abolished. Lenin emphasized a two-phase transition: first, a “lower phase” of communism (socialism) in which a state is still needed to suppress the defeated bourgeoisie and organize production, and later a “higher phase” where classes disappear and the state as coercive authority becomes obsolete. Luxemburg and Gramsci, too, accepted the long-term Marxist horizon of a stateless, classless society. Where they differed was in how to reach that horizon and what the proletarian state would look like in the interim.

Lenin’s Theory: State and Revolution

Lenin’s analysis of the state, especially in The State and Revolution, is rooted in a strict class antagonism perspective. He argued that the capitalist state is essentially “a special apparatus for the suppression of one class by another” – in bourgeois society, a machine for the oppression and exploitation of workers by the capitalist class. Far from being a neutral referee, the state’s laws, bureaucracy, courts, and armed forces are designed to defend private property and capitalist interests. Lenin, drawing on Engels, noted that the state consists of “special bodies of armed men” (police, military) and material extensions (prisons, etc.) that enforce class rule. In his view, the necessity of the state under capitalism stems from the irreconcilability of class interests; the ruling class requires an apparatus of coercion to hold down the exploited majority. Even a parliamentary-democratic republic, Lenin argued, is ultimately “an instrument of bourgeois rule” dressed in formal equality.

Crucially, Lenin insisted that the working class cannot simply take over the existing bourgeois state and wield it for socialist ends. The bourgeois state apparatus must be shattered in a revolution. He cited the experience of the Paris Commune (1871) as evidence that the proletariat must “smash” the old state machine and build a new form of state. That new state would be the “dictatorship of the proletariat” – a term Lenin used to denote a revolutionary government in which the working class holds power and uses it to suppress the former exploiters while reorganizing society. In Lenin’s schema, this proletarian state is a necessary and transitional institution: “establishing a proletarian state or dictatorship of the proletariat” is essential to break capitalist resistance and begin constructing socialism. However, it is not an end in itself. Lenin was emphatic that as socialism developed, the state would gradually lose its raison d’être. In the “lower phase” of communism the workers’ state still performs functions of coercion (e.g. preventing counter-revolution). But once class antagonisms and even the distinction between mental and manual labor have faded in the “higher phase,” the state’s coercive features will “wither away,” giving rise to a self-governing, classless community (communism).

Lenin’s vision of the proletarian state also included an expansion of democracy for the working majority coupled with coercion against the old ruling minority. He envisaged institutions like soviets (workers’ councils) replacing bourgeois parliaments, creating what he considered a more genuine mass democracy. The State and Revolution portrays the dictatorship of the proletariat as a form of democracy “for the people, for the majority” unprecedented under bourgeois rule. But this democracy explicitly excludes the overthrown bourgeoisie, who would be deprived of political rights and subject to suppression. In practice, Lenin’s approach prioritized centralized authority and disciplined control (he famously advocated a vanguard party to lead the revolution). This raised questions about how democratic the proletarian dictatorship would remain – questions that Luxemburg would pointedly address. Nonetheless, Lenin’s primary contribution was to reassert the necessity of revolution and a transitional state in an era when many Social Democrats drifted toward reformism. He forcefully argued that no incremental reforms or electoral victories could transform the class character of the bourgeois state; only a revolutionary rupture and “shattering [of] the bourgeois state machinery” would open the road to socialism.

Gramsci’s Theory: Hegemony and the Integral State

Writing a decade later, Antonio Gramsci accepted Lenin’s basic premise of the state as an organ of class domination, but he introduced a critical expansion of the concept. Gramsci observed that in advanced capitalist societies, bourgeois rule is maintained not only by coercion but by achieving the active consent of subordinate classes. In his Prison Notebooks, he developed the concept of hegemony to describe the ideological leadership through which the ruling class “cultivate[s] consensual support” in civil society. Gramsci famously defined the modern capitalist state as “political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion.” In this “integral state” model, political society refers to the institutions of coercion and direct domination (government, laws, police, military), whereas civil society encompasses the networks of culture, institutions, and social norms (schools, churches, media, associations, intellectual life) that manufacture consent. The state’s function in a class society, therefore, is twofold: it is “the instrument by which a ruling class maintains its dominance over society” (coercively), and the medium of an “ethical” or cultural leadership that shapes beliefs and values in support of that dominance.

Gramsci emphasized that by the late 19th and early 20th century, bourgeois hegemony had become integral to capitalist stability in the West. The necessity of the state for capitalism was not only to put down revolts or strikes by force, but to prevent revolt by making the ruling class’s leadership appear natural and beneficial. For instance, through education, religion, and mass media, capitalist values and the legitimacy of the social order are internalized by workers, who consent to their own subordination. Coercion remains as a backup—“the armour of coercion” behind hegemony —and is deployed in moments of crisis. As Gramsci noted, in normal times “coercion… was no longer the primary form of rule, except in moments of crisis… when spontaneous consent has failed.” This insight diverged from Lenin’s more narrow focus on the state’s coercive apparatus. Gramsci showed that ideological control and social networks are as vital as prisons and bayonets for class rule. Hence, the terrain of class struggle extends into civil society. The ruling class can allow certain concessions or reforms, “compromising” with subordinate interests, to maintain broad support. The state in capitalist society cannot be seen as a mere “administrative unit of executive authority” separate from society; it is deeply “intertwined” with civil society, securing order by a complex equilibrium of force and consent.

This analysis led Gramsci to rethink the strategy for socialist transformation. In his view, a revolutionary movement could not succeed by focusing exclusively on seizing the coercive “political society” (e.g. via a sudden insurrection) while ignoring the entrenched ideological structures. Revolution required constructing a counter-hegemony within civil society. Gramsci distinguished between a “war of manoeuvre” and a “war of position.” The former – akin to the Leninist insurrectionary assault – might have succeeded in Russia, where the state was relatively autonomous and civil society weak (“primordial and gelatinous” in Gramsci’s words ). But in Western Europe, with its dense civil society (“sturdy structure of civil society”), a direct frontal attack was likely to be repelled. Instead, a protracted war of position was needed: a gradual struggle to “win tactical strongholds” in civil society, building up proletarian culture, organizations, and alliances to undermine bourgeois consent. Only after gaining substantial hegemony in society could the working class effectively seize state power. In summary, Gramsci did not reject revolution, but he elaborated a more complex path to it: socialist forces must fight on the battlefield of ideas and institutions, not just in the street. The goal remained to establish a workers’ state, but Gramsci envisioned that as establishing a new hegemony (a working-class cultural and moral leadership) sustained by force if necessary rather than force alone.

Regarding the dictatorship of the proletariat, Gramsci’s writings are more oblique (partly due to prison censorship), but he essentially reframed it in terms of hegemony. He argued that any enduring class rule – including that of the proletariat – must combine “domination” (force) and “intellectual and moral leadership” (consent). Thus, a proletarian state should aim to become an “ethical state” that not only coercively represses the old exploiters but also educates and involves the masses, incorporating other classes under working-class leadership. Unlike Lenin, who put immediate emphasis on suppressive functions, Gramsci suggested that a socialist dictatorship would exercise as much leadership and consent as possible, relying on coercion mainly in “moments of crisis.” This perspective aligns with Luxemburg’s emphasis on mass participation, though Gramsci arrived at it from a theoretical angle of cultural strategy. In essence, Gramsci expanded the Marxist theory of the state by illuminating its ideological role (hegemony), thereby influencing subsequent Marxist thought on how capitalist dominance can be challenged beyond brute force alone.

Rosa Luxemburg’s Theory: Revolution and Democracy

Rosa Luxemburg, a revolutionary contemporary of Lenin, shared the commitment to overthrowing the bourgeois state, yet her vision of the proletarian transformation of the state was marked by a strong insistence on mass democracy and skepticism toward authoritarianism. In Reform or Revolution (1900), written against Eduard Bernstein’s evolutionary socialism, Luxemburg forcefully argued that the capitalist state cannot be reformed into socialism. She echoed the orthodox view that the bourgeois state serves the interests of capital and that gradualist tactics are doomed. Any “progressive” measures the state enacts (such as labor laws or social programs) are conditional and limited by the needs of the ruling class. The structure of the parliamentary-democratic state itself, according to Luxemburg, is “a specific form of the bourgeois class State” – it may extend political rights, but fundamentally it helps to “ripen and develop” capitalist antagonisms, not resolve them. As capitalism advances into monopoly and imperialism, the contradiction between “the interests of the bourgeoisie as a class and the needs of economic progress” grows, and the state’s policies (tariffs, militarism) turn ever more reactionary to defend capital. This analysis led Luxemburg to conclude that only a revolution could break the cycle. Famously, she wrote that reforms under bourgeois democracy, even if well-intentioned, ultimately “strengthened and consolidated” the capitalist system; “only the hammer blow of revolution…the conquest of political power by the proletariat can break down this wall.” In other words, socialism required smashing the bourgeois state just as Lenin argued, and replacing it with workers’ rule.

Where Luxemburg diverged from Lenin was in her conception of how the dictatorship of the proletariat should function. She agreed with Lenin (and Marx) on the principle of a proletarian state in the transition period – she did not shy away from the term “dictatorship of the proletariat.” However, she emphatically defined that dictatorship in democratic terms. In her 1918 pamphlet The Russian Revolution, penned while reflecting on the Bolshevik revolution, Luxemburg praised Lenin and Trotsky’s revolutionary audacity but cautioned against policies that stifled democracy. She argued that the Bolsheviks mistakenly counterposed “dictatorship” to “democracy.” In her view, “dictatorship of the proletariat… means the mostactive, unlimited participation of the mass of the people, of unlimited democracy”. Rather than a dictatorship by a small party leadership, it must be “a dictatorship of the class, not of a party or clique,” exercised “in the broadest possible form” with workers themselves directly engaging in governance. Luxemburg believed that socialist democracy is both the means and end of the revolution: it “begins with the destruction of class rule” and the seizure of power, “not something that only begins in the promised land after the foundations of socialist economy are laid.” In other words, from day one of the revolution, the proletarian state must permit free debate, elections, and the flowering of workers’ councils and unions as the living structure of the new society.

Luxemburg famously wrote, “Freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently.” This was not a liberal platitude but rooted in her Marxist conviction that the vitality of the proletarian revolution depends on broad democratic input and critique. If the new state suppresses dissent among workers or socialist factions, it suffocates the very source of creativity and class learning that socialism requires. She warned that if the proletarian dictatorship turns into rule by a party elite, it would, “instead of being the rule of the revolutionary majority, [become] a dictatorship of a handful…in the name of the proletariat,” eventually just the dictatorship of a clique. This, she predicted, would be fatal: the socialist project would degenerate into bureaucracy and coercion over the working class, betraying the revolution’s emancipatory promise. Her fears were tragically prescient in light of later Soviet developments.

It is important to note that Luxemburg did not reject the need for coercive measures against the old ruling classes. In fact, she acknowledged that the proletariat, in defending its revolution, would have to act “in the most energetic, unhesitating fashion” and perform “attacks upon the well-entrenched rights and interests of bourgeois society.” In this sense her proletarian state would also wield force to dismantle capitalism. But the legitimacy and effectiveness of that force, for Luxemburg, hinged on maintaining workers’ democratic power. She envisaged a socialist government where multiparty debates among socialists, freedom of the press and assembly, and elections within workers’ councils would ensure that the state truly acted in the interest of the broad proletariat. Such political liberties were not bourgeois indulgences to her, but the very means through which the working class forges its consciousness and unity. Thus, Luxemburg’s model of the workers’ state placed far greater weight on ideological and political empowerment of the masses (from below) than on top-down discipline. In modern terms, she leaned towards a radically democratic socialism—some have called it a libertarian Marxist stance—within the framework of Marxist revolutionary theory.

Comparative Analysis: Hegemony, Coercion, and Proletarian Power

Shared Foundations: Lenin, Gramsci, and Luxemburg all root their theories in the Marxist understanding that the state in a class society functions to preserve class domination. Each agrees that the bourgeois capitalist state serves the interests of the capitalist class, whether through naked force or through structuring the economic and legal order to favor capital. They also share the belief that the bourgeois state cannot be simply taken over intact by workers; it must be overthrown or fundamentally transformed via revolution. All three accept that a transitional period after the revolution – often termed the dictatorship of the proletariat – is necessary to suppress capitalist resistance and develop socialism. Finally, they concur that the ultimate aim is a classless, stateless society (communism) in which the state as an instrument of class rule will no longer be needed. In these broad strokes, their perspective is united by a common Marxist framework, and each draws heavily from Marx and Engels (e.g. Engels’ dictum that the state “withers away” when class antagonisms end is echoed by Lenin  and assumed by the others).

Key Divergences: Despite this foundation, significant differences emerge in how each theorist conceptualizes the state’s role and the strategy for socialism:

• Coercion vs. Consent – The Mechanisms of Rule: Lenin’s analysis foregrounds the coercive apparatus of the state. For him, the essential nature of the bourgeois state is repressive violence (police, army, courts) in defense of the ruling class, and likewise the proletarian state would principally use coercion against the bourgeoisie until class threats abated. Gramsci, by contrast, illuminated the state’s ideological role. He introduced hegemony as a central concept, arguing that bourgeois rule is secured through cultural institutions and consent as much as through force. This divergence meant Gramsci saw the battle for socialism not just as a clash of arms or a seizure of government, but as a protracted struggle to win hearts and minds in civil society. Luxemburg’s view on this spectrum is somewhat intermediate: she did not theorize hegemony in the abstract way Gramsci did, but she strongly believed in the political enlightenment of the proletariat through open democratic practice. In effect, Luxemburg valued consent in the form of class consciousness and willing mass participation – she thought the workers’ state should derive its authority from democratic involvement, not from imposing a party line by force. Thus, while Lenin focused on state coercion to uproot the old order, Gramsci emphasized winning ideological leadership, and Luxemburg stressed maintaining popular legitimacy and participation in the new order.

• Hegemony and Civil Society: Gramsci’s unique contribution was his detailed focus on civil society as part of the state’s extended reality. Neither Lenin nor Luxemburg wrote at length about the role of churches, media, schools, and intellectuals in buttressing capitalism. Lenin acknowledged the importance of propaganda and agitation, but these were adjunct to the main task of seizing power. Luxemburg, for her part, trusted in the spontaneous development of class consciousness through struggle (as seen in her theory of mass strikes) more than in any systematic battle of ideas orchestrated by a party. Gramsci’s notion of an “integral state” and his strategy of a “war of position” addressed a gap in classical Marxism by explaining why, in developed democracies, the ruling class could maintain power even without constant violence: the cultural institutions create a sturdy “trenches” that revolutionary forces must gradually capture. This marks a divergence in strategic orientation: Lenin and Luxemburg in 1917–1918 were oriented toward immediate insurrectionary opportunities in a crisis (World War I and its aftermath), whereas Gramsci in the West argued for a longer-term infiltration and alteration of capitalist civil society.

• Dictatorship of the Proletariat and Democracy: All three agree that the proletariat should rule after the revolution, but they envision this rule differently. Lenin’s concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat involves a centralized authority (ideally exercised through soviets and led by the Communist Party) that would use whatever means necessary to defeat the bourgeoisie. In practice, this meant a relatively authoritarian regime (though Lenin hoped it would be tempered by worker involvement at local levels). Luxemburg’s concept of proletarian dictatorship is far more libertarian and grassroots. She maintained it must be “the work of the class and not of a little leading minority”, under constant public control and with “unlimited democracy” for the working masses. Where Lenin was willing to suppress political pluralism (banning opposition parties, censoring hostile media) as inherently bourgeois, Luxemburg wanted a pluralism within the working-class movement – different socialist tendencies, debates, and dissent – as a safeguard against bureaucratic degeneration. Gramsci did not explicitly spell out the form of the proletarian state, but his emphasis on hegemony implies that the dictatorship of the proletariat would not rely on coercion alone. In one note he wrote that the proletarian class must become a “leading” (hegemonic) class before and after seizing power, suggesting a form of dominance that rests on broad consent of other groups (peasants, petty bourgeoisie) even during the dictatorship phase. In summary, Lenin advocated a disciplined dictatorship of the proletariat that might restrict political freedoms in the short term, Luxemburg advocated a highly democratic dictatorship of the proletariat that preserves political freedoms for workers, and Gramsci conceptualized proletarian rule as a new hegemonic order where consent would outshine coercion, achieved through a long preparatory process.

• Transformation and Abolition of the State: Lenin and Luxemburg were closer to each other in insisting on revolutionary rupture. Both polemicized against the Second International leaders who believed in a peaceful, parliamentary road. Luxemburg’s phrase “socialism or barbarism” encapsulates her view that without revolution, capitalism would lead to disaster, and she even argued that trying to only win reforms would eventually erode the workers’ movement. Gramsci did not disagree – he remained a Communist committed to revolution – but he painted a scenario wherein the “rupture” might be delayed until a slow conquest of civil society had shifted the balance of forces. In terms of the final abolition of the state, none of the three deviated from the classical position that once class divisions are gone, the state (as a coercive entity) disappears. However, the tone and focus differ: Lenin wrote extensively about the withering of the state in the future communist society , underscoring that socialism is not the end goal but a transition to stateless communism. Luxemburg took this as given from Marx, but her short life and writings did not elaborate much on the far future; she was more preoccupied with the immediate task of ensuring the revolution stayed true to socialist democracy. Gramsci’s discussion of withering away is limited, but by stressing that the proletarian rule must also achieve hegemony (not just domination), he implied a form of workers’ state that could organically merge with society – an educator state that might eventually render separate coercive structures unnecessary. None expected the state to be abolished overnight; the divergence lay in how they balanced repression and emancipation during the transition.

Conclusion

Lenin, Gramsci, and Rosa Luxemburg each contributed enduring insights to Marxist theory about the state in class society, agreeing on fundamentals yet diverging on crucial nuances. Lenin provides the clearest blueprint for revolutionary conquest of power: he defined the state as a weapon of class rule that the proletariat must seize and turn against the bourgeoisie, even as he insisted this new state would be temporary and increasingly democratic for the working majority. Gramsci recast the problem for a different context, arguing that bourgeois domination is upheld by cultural hegemony; consequently, the proletariat’s task is as much to build a new ideological consensus as to smash the old state. His integral vision of the state bridged the gap between coercion and consent, highlighting the role of ideology and civil institutions in maintaining class society. Luxemburg, fervently revolutionary like Lenin, nonetheless placed her trust in the self-activity of the masses. She warned that the proletarian state must not become a mere “dictatorship of the party” at the expense of the working class’s democratic freedoms . In effect, she saw the state’s transformation as inseparable from the political enrichment and empowerment of the proletariat itself – the means of liberation must embody the end.

All three thinkers share a Marxist pedigree and faced the challenges of their tumultuous times: World War I, the Russian Revolution, the rise of fascism, and the crisis of socialism. Their theories reflect those contexts – Lenin’s focusing on immediate revolutionary strategy, Gramsci’s on the slow grind of bourgeois stability, and Luxemburg’s on preserving socialist principles in practice. Together, their work paints a comprehensive picture of the state’s dual character: an apparatus of repression and an arena of social leadership. They debate how much change can come through destroying the old coercive apparatus versus subverting the old ideological order, and how to ensure the workers’ state embodies liberation and not oppression. These debates remain deeply relevant. Modern discussions on how to achieve social transformation – whether through ruptural revolution, cultural struggle, or radical democracy – still draw on the contributions of Lenin, Gramsci, and Luxemburg. Their shared foundations remind us why the state cannot be viewed as neutral in a class-divided society, while their divergences illuminate that even within Marxism, there are different paths imagined toward the withering away of class power and the state. Each of these revolutionaries, in their own way, sought to resolve the riddle of how the proletariat could use the state to abolish the need for a state – a paradox at the heart of Marxist theory that their collective insights help to untangle.